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/HDUQLQJIURP1HZ/DERXU¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH1+6 
Abstract 
This article treats /DERXU¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH1+6EHWZHHQDQGas representing a 
VHULHVRIµprogramme theories¶ to consider what we can learn from them about healthcare and 
public reorganization more generally. It suggests /DERXU¶Vprogramme theory of µGHOLYHU\¶
does have, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework, potential for learning how better 
to handle performance managementEXWWKDWµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶ has not achieved the 
goals asked of it. /DERXU¶VXVHRILQFUHased funding for the NHS appeared to be linked to an 
improvement in patient satisfaction and health outcomes, both of which now risk being 
undermined. Finally, the Private Finance Initiative presents a significant legacy and challenge 
to policymakers and NHS organizations today because of the financial commitments it 
requires of organizations that put in place poorly-negotiated deals, and are now in a difficult 
funding situation.  
Introduction 
Policymakers seem to find the urge to want to change the way healthcare is organized almost 
irresistible. Doing so, however, as governments across the world have repeatedly found out, 
is expensive and time-consuming. In the UK, the National Health Service, after experiencing 
relative stability between its founding in 1948 and its first substantial reorganization in 1974, 
has been subject to substantial changes with increasing frequency. In the 1980s changes built 
on the NHS management inquiry (Department of Health and Social Security, 1983) to try and 
make the service better-run. In the 1990s, DQµinternal market¶ZDVLQWURGXFHG (Secretaries of 
State for Health, 1989) which attempted to create a dynamic where a split between purchasers 
and providers would generate improvements. After their election to power in 1997, Labour 
engaged in an almost hyperactive series of changes to the organization of the NHS in 
England (with devolution taking other UK countries down a different path). A key question 
WKLVSHULRGDVNVLVµwhat can we learn from Labour¶V health policy between 1997 and 2010"¶ 
 
Method 
While it is relatively straightforward to try and draw lessons from different attempts at NHS 
reorganization, trying to work out what we can learn from such reorganizations more 
generally is a more significant challenge.  
BHFDXVH/DERXU¶VFKDQJHVWRWKH1+S came with such frequency it is hard to disentangle the 
effects of one change from another. Although we see can see improvements in NHS waiting 
times and public satisfaction up to 2010, we can also see significant research showing targets 
ZHUHµJDPHG¶DQG complaints about increases in funding not being spent in the most effective 
ways. How are we to attribute these effects to specific changes, and see what appears to have 
worked, and what did not? Finding a means of disentangling the effects of different 
organizational changes is a difficult but important task. 
To try and address these challenges, this paper adopts an approach based on 3DZVRQ¶V
realism (Pawson, 2006 , 2013 , Pawson et al, 2005), in trying to extract contextually-sensitive 
SURJUDPPHWKHRULHVIURP/DERXU¶VUHRUJDQL]DWLRQWROHDUQOHVVRQVIURPWKHFKDQJHVEHtween 
1997 and 2010 for policy today. 
In contrast to more conventional approaches to evaluation and review, Pawson suggests that 
we need to consider not only evidence about what appears to have worked in specific 
instances, but also the context within which those changes occurred, the theory that they 
appear to draw from, and the outcomes that resulted as consequence. The patterns between 
context (C), mechanism (M), and outcome (O) can be used to compare evidence of what 
happened in each case with both poliF\PDNHUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVDQGH[LVWLQJtheories to generate 
learning which we might be able to use to inform future policy. 
Perhaps 3DZVRQ¶VPRVWFHOHEUDWHGH[DPSOHLVDURXQGµQDPLQJDQGVKDPLQJ¶ZKLFKKHVKRZV
applies to a range of different approaches to public service change. Here interventions as 
GLYHUVHDVµ$6%2V¶anti-social behaviour orders), sex offender regulations. and the use of 
league tables of performance measures, all share an underlying theory of behaviour in which 
the use of public censure of one kind or another is meant to influence behave to drive it in the 
direction policymakers sought, but with very different outcomes. The differences we find 
give us the opportunity to explore the patterns of outcomes and how they related to specific 
contexts and mechanisms to generate a µSURJUDPPHtheory¶ of how and when naming and 
shaming interventions might work, and when they do not. Generating programme theories in 
this way allows us to link findings from a particular public service to attempts to reorganize 
services in another area, as well as with theories of behavioural or policy change more 
generally. 
 
The context of healthcare under Labour  
Any exploration of what lessons we can draw from policy has to take account of the wider 
context in which it occurred. This in itself represents a formidable challenge as it is difficult 
to find a boundary to differentiate which elements of context to include as relevant, and 
which to exclude. We can find some key factors in the existing literature which set a context 
which Labour inherited in coming to power, and sought to shape during their period in office. 
$FHQWUDOSDUWRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHµ1HZ/DERXU¶SURMHFWFRPHVLQWKHSRVLWLRQLQJRIWKH
party as economically credible and business-friendly (Mandelson, 2011), a very conscious 
DWWHPSWWRGLVWDQFHWKHSDUW\IURPWKHSHUFHLYHGHOHFWRUDOZHDNQHVVRIWKHµWD[DQGVSHQG¶
reputation of Labour in the past (Blair, 2010). The first Blair government initially promised to 
remain within the spending limits set by the Conservative government which came before 
them, hoping to establish economic credibility amongst the electorate, as well as avoiding 
problems from international speculators (Hay & Watson, 1999). This set an initial context 
where increases in public service expenditure were not initially possible. 
As it became clear that Labour were likely to be re-elected, as the economy grew and the 
opposition seemed unable to make ground, the government sought a model by which welfare 
expenditure could be increased. This led to an implicit arrangement with the City of London 
in which Labour avoided regulating the activities of new financial areas such as derivatives, 
and reduced corporate taxation for those engaged in trading activities in the City on the 
grounds that this was entrepreneurial. In return, the growth of the City of London would help 
fund an expansion in welfare services (Richards, 2010). 
Health context 
7KHLPPHGLDWHFRQWH[W/DERXULQKHULWHGLQZDVRQHZKHUHDQµLQWHUQDOPDUNHW¶IRU
healthcare had been controversially put in place in the early 1990s, but from which the 
government had gradually moved away (Wainwright, 1998) with an increased stress on 
partnership working instead (Secretary of State for Health, 1996). Labour appeared to accept 
the principle that any problems faced by the NHS were not due to its relative low level of 
funding compared to other health systems (Secretary of State for Health, 1997), while at the 
same time it was becoming clear that building infrastructure was in need of significant capital 
investment that had not been achieved by previous attempts to address that shortfall (Mohan, 
2002). The result was Labour inheriting a predominantly public market for care that was 
lying mostly dormant except for some experimentation around GP purchasing (Goodwin, 
1998), which had a weakening infrastructure. 
7KHUHZHUHSHUKDSVWKUHHSKDVHVLQ/DERXU¶VKHDOWKSROLF\LQWKHLUHDUO\\HDUVLQSRZHU
(Greener, 2004). In 1997, there was an election promise to reduce waiting times and a claim 
to be abolishing the internal market on the grounds that it was bureaucratic and wasteful 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1997). By 2000, the NHS Plan was published (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2000), with its long-term focus on improving performance while promising 
increased investment. Then in 2001 and 2002 we can see a re-emphasis on the use of choice 
and competition, combined with a funding system that sought to reward providers of care that 
could attract contracts for their services (Department of Health, 2001 , 2002). These changes 
overlapped with one another, adding incrementally to the reorganization agenda rather than 
attempting to put in place change through a single programme of change, and led to concerns 
that Labour were µUHGLVRUJDQLVLQJ¶WKH1+6EHFDXVHRIWKHFRQWLQXDOSDFHRIFKDQJH(Smith 
et al, 2001). In addition to this, there was the promise from Tony Blair on television that his 
government would increase NHS funding to that of the European average (which may have 
happened without him consulting his Chancellor first (Klein, 2006)), a series of other 
experiments in the integration of health and social care services, the use of the Private 
Finance Initiative inherited from the Conservatives to try and deal with health infrastructure 
challenges, and after 2003, the gradual extension of the market for healthcare to encourage 
greater non-public competition.  
The context of health policy changed dramatically between 1997 and 2003, moving toward a 
model based on performance management, the use of a new market for healthcare, expanding 
the funding of infrastructure through the Private Finance Initiative, and increasing funding for 
the service more generally ± but only if the NHS could show significant change in return. 
 
Mechanisms of health policy change under New Labour 
As /DERXU¶VFHQWUDOLGHDVDERXWSXEOLFRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVRFKDQJHGtheir programme theories 
began to proliferate. This article will explore the four main programme theories which cover 
the main elements of their approach to healthcare reorganization. These four programme 
WKHRULHVFDQQRWFRYHUHYHU\DVSHFWRI/DERXU¶VDSSURDFKEXWGRVHHPWROLQNVXIILFLHQWO\WR
reviews of the period (Mays et al, 2011) to suggest that they have considerable explanatory 
SRZHU7KHIRXUSURJUDPPHWKHRULHVDUHµGHOLYHU\¶µFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶µ3),¶, and 
µIXQGLQJ¶.  
Delivery 
The general programme theory for performance improvement in public services from Labour 
ZDVEDVHGRQµGHOLYHU\¶(Barber, 2007). The approach is based on the iterative setting of 
targets against which performance is measured to ensure that central policy is being carried 
out by those responsible at local levels for it. Although Labour claimed to have moved away 
IURPWKHµFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶DSSURDFKRIWKHSDVWWKHLUFRQFHUQWREHVHHQWREHPHHWLQJ
the promises they had made the electorate along with improvements in information 
technology, meant that they could far more proactively measure and monitor the targets they 
were setting for public services than had been the case before. 
,QWKH1+6ZHFDQVHHWZRYDULDWLRQVRIWKHµGHOLYHU\¶SURJUDPPHWKHRU\± one in hospitals 
in England, and one in GP practices in both England and Scotland, allowing some 
comparison to take place. In English hospitals, targets were set, often at a high level, for a 
range of outcomes with waiting times a special concern because of their public visibility, but 
also because of LabRXU¶VSURPLVHVWRUHGXFHWKHPLQWKHLUPDQLIHVWR)URPWKHVH
targets, composite measures were constructed to grade the overall performance of a hospital, 
initially based on traffic lights (red, amber, green) (Secretary of State for Health, 2000), but 
ODWHUXVLQJVFDOHVZLWKPHDVXUHVVXFKDVµJRRG¶DQGµSRRU¶EXWZLWKWKRVHVFDOHVRIWHQ
varying in terms of their labels and their measures from year to year, and leading to concerns 
about how confidently we could claim they measure the underlying performance they were 
meant to capture (Bevan & Hood, 2006)/DERXUFODLPHGWRRIIHULQFUHDVHGµHDUQHG
DXWRQRP\¶WRRUJDQL]DWLRQVthey were able to show that were able to meet targets, and who 
were promised additional sources of funding or freedoms from inspection. 
,Q*3VXUJHULHVµGHOLYHU\¶ZDVKDQGOHGLQDGLIIHUHQWZD\,QWKHµ4XDOLW\DQG2XWFRPHV
)UDPHZRUN¶42)targets were put in place, but only after extensive consultation with 
leaders from the profession as part of the introduction of a new GP contract. Targets were at a 
less abstract level, were grounded in everyday clinical practices such as smoking cessation, 
and were presented as being based on clinical evidence rather than being based on politically 
motivated goals such as waiting times. The way GPs practices were financed was changed to 
try and link successful measured performance in the QOF to improved funding for them. 
Choice and competition 
In addition to its programme theory of µdelivery¶, the Labour government also put in place a 
programme of  µFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶designed to increase NHS responsiveness (Greener 
& Powell, 2009). This was based around increasing competition for care contracts between 
both public and non-public providers, with those who were successful receiving additional 
funding. Such competition created the opportunity for patients to make choices about where 
they would be referred to especially in secondary care. TKLVµFRPSHWLWLRQDQGFKRLFH¶ 
approach was intended to work, much like the Conservative internal market of the 1990s, by 
making sure financial flows rewarded the best providers of care in a competitive market for it 
(Department of Health, 2002).  
PFI 
Throughout their period in office Labour took forward an approach to funding infrastructure 
± the private finance initiative (PFI) ± that they had inherited from the previous Conservative 
government. PFI in the NHS represented a significant expansion of much-needed capital 
investment being put in place to improve both hospitals and GP surgeries. PFI deals were 
negotiated locally between the public and private sector in which the latter provided 
financing and building expertise for the building of new facilities, and then gave an 
undertaking to maintain the buildings, with the former then paying for these deals over an 
extended period of typically 25-30 years. The programme theory here was that public 
infrastructure need and funding would be matched with private sector enterprise and delivery 
to address infrastructural gaps and by-pass the delays in public infrastructural funding that 
had previous attempts at increasing capital expenditure. PFI deals were the preferred model 
of funding public infrastructure as they appeared in government accounts in a phased manner 
across their lifetime, rather than showing a significant initial liability, and so did not breach 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VERUURZLQJlimits, and so undermine their fiscal credibility. 
Funding 
Finally, Labour put in place a review of health funding (Wanless, 2002) which suggested that 
increased expenditure on the area was needed. The programme theory here is that increased 
funding would lead to improved services ± and was made explicit from Secretaries of State in 
their speeches at the time (Reid, 2004), and represented a change from the 1997 position of 
not regarding a lack of funding as being a significant barrier to improving the NHS. 
Having outlined the four main mechanisms by which Labour attempted to improve the NHS, 
we can now explore their outcomes.  
Outcomes 
Delivery and funding 
There are a range of measurable improvements in health indicators between 1997 and 2010. 
As well as health expenditure increasing, there was a rise in GPs and Hospital Doctors per 
1,000 population that was also above trend. Both male and female life expectancy figures 
rose throughout the period. and there was a rise in treatments such as hip replacements and 
cataract operations that was above trend as well. Waiting times for treatments such as cataract 
surgery fell significantly (especially in Scotland), as they did for hip and knee replacements. 
Trends in amenable mortality for both men and women fell across the decade. Public 
satisfaction with the NHS at the end of the decade was at an all-time high. In GP surgeries the 
QOF reorganisation led to improvements in the outcomes measured by the process, so that 
funding to surgeries increased significantly (Bevan et al, 2014). 
Accepting some national variations, the overall picture then is one that appears to suggest that 
the NHS in the 2000s did achieve a range of notable successes. However, there were also 
problems, and working out what factors led to both successes and problems, is more 
complicated. It is possible that the achievements of the 2000s were entirely down to factors 
outside of the NHS ± to rising standards of lLYLQJIRUH[DPSOHLPSURYLQJSHRSOH¶VKHDOWK
However, factors external to the NHS seem less likely to be able to explain falls in waiting 
times or that so many of the changes outlined above occurred at above-trend rates in the 
period 2000-2010. 
The result of use of WKHµGHOLYHU\¶SURJUDPPHWKHRU\can be usefully considered in the 
different contexts of hospitals and GP surgeries. In English hospitals, targets were effectively 
imposed on hospitals rather than being negotiated with clinical representatives or being 
linked through evidence to system-wide goals for health improvement. As such, the targets 
were often seen by those in hospitals as being political in nature, and so imposed upon staff 
working in those settings. The targets were also seen by managers as being career-ending if 
they were not achieved, or if their hospital was indicated to be poorly performing in relation 
to others ± WKH\ZHUHµ3¶WDUJHWVWKHWD[IRUPIRUWKHIRUFHGHQGRIHPSOR\PHQWLVD3LQ
the UK) (Bevan & Hood, 2006).  
The result of hospital targets being seen as externally-imposed, political and potentially 
career-HQGLQJIRUPDQDJHUVUHVXOWHGLQWKHPEHLQJµJDPHG¶H[WHQVLYHO\$YDULHW\RI
different means of such gaming appeared, from waiting times being manipulated through 
patients being offered appointments they were unlikely to accept (around holiday times), and 
then being moved to the back of the waiting list if they refused, through to simple fraud and 
patients being removed from lists returned to the Department of Health. The drive on waiting 
times did, overall, lead to waiting times coming down, but doctors argued that clinical 
priorities were being taken out of their hands with decisions being made in an environment in 
which managers feared for their jobs (Hood, 2006). 
In GP surgeries, in comparison, doctors were consulted on how the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) was set up, and the targets were presented as being based on clinical 
evidence and measures of quality to an extent that GPs regarded them as legitimate 
(Checkland et al, 2007) even if the extent to which this is true can be questioned (Fleetcroft & 
Cookson, 2006). GPs then went about organising their practices to achieve the maximum 
scores they could under the system, and boosting activities which the QOF system measured 
to a point where they secured funding increases. There is little evidence of the systematic 
gaming of QOF systems (Roland & Guthrie, 2016), and it seems GPs were prepared to 
manage colleagues who were seen as bringing down performance through their actions 
(McDonald et al, 2007). Practice organisation was changed to make best use of the full range 
of health professionals, so that patients could be seen in a way that conformed with the QOFs 
goals. From the perspective of achieving collective behavioural change in GP practices, the 
QOF represents a remarkable success.  
There were also concerns, however, with the QOF. GPs expressed concerns about their lives 
becoming dominated by form-filling and screen-driven prompts that interfered with them 
providing the best possible care (McCartney, 2012). There were also questions about whether 
target thresholds were initially set too low to achieve significant improvements in health 
outcomes (Roland & Guthrie, 2016), or that the targets were not adapted over time to drive 
sustained improvements (Doran et al, 2014). These concerns, amongst others, led to the QOF 
being removed in Scotland. However, QOF is remarkable in that it at least initially led to the 
real behavioural change outlined above in a way that few performance management systems 
in healthcare have ever achieved. 
Because of devolution, the NHS in Scotland offers us a means of comparing the results of 
seeing an increase in funding of the same scale as appeared in England in the 2000s, but 
ZLWKRXWWKHXVHRIµGHOLYHU\¶in respect of hospitals (Scotland did use the QOF during 
/DERXU¶VWHUPVLQRIILFH), and in an era in Scotland of remarkable continuity in terms of 
formal organizational structures (Steel & Cyclus, 2012). Such a comparison will always be 
imperfect ± not OHDVWEHFDXVH6FRWODQG¶VDVVHVVHGQHHGIRUKHDOWKFDUHLVJUHDWHUWKDQ
(QJODQG¶V (Bevan et al, 2014), and because its funding levels per person are historically a 
little higher. A little dishearteningly for researchers, there are also substantial problems in 
FRPSDULQJ(QJODQGDQG6FRWODQGRUDQ\RIWKHµKRPH¶QDWLRQVEHFDXVHRIVLJQLILFDQW
differences in the way that data is collected between the two countries. 
However, research comparing the four nations of the UK in terms of health service 
performance in the 2000s (Bevan et al, 2014) presents the remarkable finding that, at the end 
of the first decade of the new millennium, there was almost nothing to choose between the 
health service performance of England and Scotland that can be measured, and that there 
were no specific different reorganization mechanisms across the home nations that were 
making any difference to long-term health WUHQGV7KHUHSRUWZULWHVWKDWWKLVµODck of clear-cut 
differences in performance may be surprising given the extent of debate about differences in 
structure, provider competition, patient choice and use of non-NHS providers across the four 
FRXQWULHV¶S 
This means we can see similar measured improvements in both English and Scottish health 
DQGKHDOWKFDUHGXULQJ/DERXU¶VJRYHUQPHQWVEXWZLWK6FRWODQGQRWKDYLQJHQJDJHGLQWKH
XVHRIµGHOLYHU\¶LQKRVSLWDOV7his would suggest that the increases in funding that both 
countries share are a strong candidate for helping to explain the improvements that both 
systems have achieved.  
Although NHS budgets since 2010 have been protected in that they have not seen the 
significant reductions in other public services, local government budgets have seen real-terms 
reductions of well over a third (National Audit Office, 2014). This has meant that 
community-based health services have experienced significant reductions in funding, and this 
in turn has put pressures on the NHS, with patients who might have been treated in the 
community ending up in accident and emergency departments, and hospitals struggling to 
discharge patients for lack of local support services. Since NHS funding has entered a more 
restricted period since 2010, problems with Accident and Emergency services and rising 
public concerns over the quality have care in both England and Scotland have reappeared 
(Bevan et al, 2014). Again, this is not conclusive as suggesting the improvements between 
1997 and 2010 were due to funding alone, but it does seem to suggest the importance of 
funding in explaining the health service improvements under Labour. 
Choice and competition 
The exact HIIHFWVRI/DERXU¶VLQFUHDVHGXVHRIµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶mechanisms are hard 
to disaggregate from their use of performance management, and from its increased funding of 
healthcare. There are two main interpretations, however. The first is that the use of the 
purchaser-provider split between 1989 and 2010 (including a brief interlude between 1997-
2001 when Labour claimed to have abolished it), has been a significant error. The argument 
here is that the separation of purchaser and provider services did not lead to sufficient 
improvements so that the costs of reorganizations do not exceed any benefits they have 
generated. This was the view of the Health Select Committee (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2010) that reported at the HQGRI/DERXU¶VWHUPLQRIILFHDQGSRLQWHG to failures 
RQSXUFKDVLQJµFRPPLVVLRQLQJ¶IXQFWLRQV This perspective also emphasises the difference 
between the actual structure of the market for care in the NHS, and the ideal-type economic 
theory which is meant to provide its justification ± and which builds on well-established work 
which includes that of prominent economists (Arrow, 1963). 
A second view comes from research that suggests that markets have improved care ± and 
perhaps even saved lives. This research points to changes in particular clinical indexes which, 
the authors claim, have relationships with areas where market-like structures are most likely 
to have resulted as a consequence of the reorganization (Cooper et al, 2011). This research 
was picked up by the Conservatives as justifying further market-based reorganization 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2010), but also led to a series of academic responses 
VXJJHVWLQJSUREOHPVZLWKWKHUHVHDUFKDXWKRUV¶DSSURDFKDQGGDWD (Bevan & Skellern, 2011 , 
Gaynor et al, 2012 , Greener, 2012 , Mays, 2011 , Pollock et al, 2011). Looking back at that 
debate (as one of the participants), it is fair to say that the use of markets did lead to changes 
of referral behaviour, especially in rural communities where patients appeared more likely to 
make choices about which hospitals to attend. It is harder, however, to justify the claim that 
market-based reorganizations µsaved lives¶DVVRPHRIWKHSURSRQHQWVRIWKDWGHEDWH
appeared to be suggesting. What is important is to assess whether the costs of the market-
based changes that required the reorganization of services exceeded the benefits that were 
obtained from themRUZKHWKHUWKHUHVRXUFHVLQYROYHGLQµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶FRXOG
have been better deployed directly on patient care. Finally, because, as we noted above, 
6FRWODQGZDVODUJHO\IUHHIURPµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶DQG\HWLWVPHDVXUHGSHUIRUPDQFH
during /DERXU¶VSHULRGLQRIILFHwas not significantly different than that of the NHS in 
(QJODQGWKLVZRXOGDOVRVXJJHVWWKDWDQ\JDLQVIURPµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶GLGQRW
significantly contribute to an overall improvement in healthcare. 
It is the case, however, that if we are to criticise market-based reorganizations, we need to 
offer an alternative. Even if care is not to be contracted for, or patients make choices in GP 
surgeries, we will need something else that works better. Scotland has avoided the costs of 
µFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶ZKLOHDFKLHYLQJWKHVDPHPHDVXUHGLPSURYHPHQWVLQKHDOWKFDUHDV
England by making greater use of collaboration and joint working between health and social 
care, with the most recent evidence suggesting that approach is showing potential to be 
successful (Audit Scotland, 2017). The NHS in England, meanwhile, appears to be moving 
toward a more collaborative approach (Pym, 2017) that suggests that the tide may be turning 
DJDLQVWWKHµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶SURJUDPPHWKHRU\ 
PFI 
The outcomes of PFI are complex and messy. It is certainly the case that a number of new 
(and much-needed) hospitals and GP surgeries have been built ± and a rate which would 
almost certainly not have occurred by making use of existing public financing schemes. 
However, the structure of the process initially appeared to lead to a situation with 
experienced private contractors negotiating with public managers and officials who had not 
been through such a process before, and may have resulted in some very poor value contracts 
being signed (Appleby, 2017). /DERXU¶Vneed to conspicuously show they were being fiscally 
responsible meant that they continued with the policy, and that there was often little 
alternative to negotiating a PFI deal if a new hospital or school was needed (Clark et al, 
2001). The legacy of PFI is unevenly distributed, but is clearly leading to financial problems 
for the worst affected trusts (Campbell, 2012) and leading to calls to bring PFI deals back 
into the public sector to avoid these bills extending into the future ± something which, for 
example, Tees, Esk and Wear Valley NHS Trust did in 2011. 
PFI is complex in that, on the one hand, a number of poor value deals have been signed that 
offer private organisations disproportionate returns, and which surely require that the state 
renegotiate them. The case for this is that it is very noticeable that where private 
organizations have decided to exit from public provision, such as Circle at Hinchingbrooke 
Hospital, no significant financial penalties have been imposed by the government (BBC 
News, 2015). It should not be the case that private organizations can exit public provision 
without significant penalty, while also requiring the public purse to pay out disproportionate 
returns for badly-negotiated contracts, often to the same companies. 
However, it is also the case that PFI deals are not just about building new facilities, but also 
about maintaining them, and the returns that the deals give to the private sector need to take 
this into consideration. It appears to be the case that the maintenance deals in some cases, 
again, appear to offer very poor value for money. In other cases, however, taking 
maintenance costs into account may make PFI deals better value than they first appear, 
especially where that maintenance is being done in a flexible and responsive manner. To 
assess PFI fully, we need to take all of its aspects into account, even if there appears to be a 
prima facie case that many such deals have not offered good value to the public purse.  
If we conclude that PFI has not worked well, then that creates the need to do something about 
it, both in terms of restructuring financial commitments from present deals. The programme 
theory of combining public sector need with private dynamism did prove in the early years of 
the scheme to be open to abuse through long-term, excessive return contracts, and addressing 
that abuse has to be an important part of learning from the process. 
Conclusion - what have we learned? 
There are a range of important lessons from the above analysis, and which we can explore, 
H[WHQGLQJ3DZVRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRSURJUDPPHWKHRULHVEXWFRQVLGHULQJQRWRQO\SDWWHUQV
EHWZHHQFRQWH[WVPHFKDQLVPVDQGRXWFRPHVEXWDOVRYLDWKHUHDOLVWQRWLRQRIµUHWURGXFWLRQ¶
(Danermark et al, 2001), what theory can help us understand the patterns we have found 
above. 
A first point general point is that Labour managed put in place a remarkable amount of 
healthcare organizational change without the protests that were seen after the introduction of 
the internal market in the early 1990s, or the prominent criticisms and concerns which the 
medical profession have raised post-2010. One possible reason for this is that Labour did not 
HQJDJHLQµELJEDQJ¶KHDOWKFDUHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQ± as the Conservatives did in 1989 and 2010, 
but instead made a number of changes over a period of time which made their approach 
appear as if they were engaging in smaller change, but with a much greater frequency. 
However, the small changes eventually led to a significant programme of change, especially 
between 2000 and 2005. This is large scale health reorganization by stealth, a new approach 
to healthcare reorganization in the UK compared to the big changes of the 1990s and 2010s. 
A slightly cynical lesson it appears to suggest is that, if policymakers want to achieve large-
scale health reorganization, it might be more successful (at least in terms of getting change 
initiated ± as we have seen, implementation is a different thing) to do it by degrees rather than 
all at once. 
$VHFRQGSRLQWFRPHVWKURXJKWKHFRPSDULVRQRIWKHµGHOLYHU\¶LQKRVpitals and GP practices. 
In hospitals there was extensive gaming and a sense that the performance measures were 
political in origin. In GP surgeries many of those problems were avoided. The difference 
appears to be that the QOF proposals were consulted upon first, that they were linked in 
GRFWRUV¶PLQGVDVEHLQJEDVHGRQHYLGHQFHDQGLPSURYLQJTXDOLW\DQGWKDWWKH\ZHUH
rewarded for good performance through increased funding. The QOF seemed to work with 
the grain of the intrinsic motivation public professionals have to do their jobs (Witesman & 
Walters, 2014), with doctors believing them to be based on evidence and with the system 
regarded by them as raising quality. Its use of pay-for-performance, from the perspective of 
intrinsic motivation theory, actually risks undermining rather than supporting service 
improvement, as it could undermine intrinsic motivation through the QOF becoming regarded 
instead as a transactional relationship rather than one based on public service (Frey & 
Osterloh, 2001). The compDULVRQRIWKHWZRFDVHVRIµGHOLYHU\¶DERYHFHUWDLQO\HPSKDVLVHV
the importance of considering the exact means by which such systems are meant to work, and 
WKHLUSRWHQWLDOHIIHFWVRQVWDIIPRWLYDWLRQXVLQJPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGLGHDVWKDQVLPSOHµFDUURW¶
and µVWLFN¶PRGHOV(Bowles, 2016). The QOF is not perfect, and as it has developed appears 
to have become increasingly bureaucratic and time-consuming for GPs, but its core idea gives 
us clues as to how to better harness the intrinsic motivation of public professionals to the end 
of service improvement. 
The main lesson of both µFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶DQGµ3),¶reorganisations is that we need 
more nuanced analyses of the exact institutional arrangements being put in place in public 
services rather than assuming either that all structures with purchasers and providers 
constitute an ideal-type market, or that complex contracting relationships can be entered into 
in a way that ensure public managers are not disadvantaged through their inexperience or 
comparative lack of resources. The error in each case here is to confuse the messy real world 
of relationships with ideal types ± in the first case with economic theory, and in the second 
with symmetrical bargaining. Instead, we might pay closer attention to the way our 
institutions are actually organised rather than assuming that theoretical dynamics will 
spontaneously appear, and so overlook the hard work involved in getting relationships to 
work efficiently and effectively. That in 2017 the NHS in England appears to have had to 
find ZD\VRIµE\-SDVVLQJ¶WKHFRPSHWLWLYHFDUHPDUNHWVintroduced by the coalition 
government of 2010 suggests that this lesson is slowly being learned on the ground (Pym, 
2017), even if policymakers might still be reluctant to acknowledge the effective 
DEDQGRQPHQWRIµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶. Equally, there is a real need for a full review of 
PFI deals to deal with their legacy, to assess whether they represent good value for the 
taxpayer. Last, there is a need for a replacement capital funding process if PFI is not the best 
way of achieving this going forward. 
It may be that the improvements in health and public satisfaction with the NHS that appeared 
under Labour came mostly from increased funding for it. It is certainly the case that public 
satisfaction has fallen since 2010 (Campbell, 2016), and waiting time targets are now 
routinely being missed (Campbell, 2017). Budgets for the NHS have been effectively frozen 
while demands on services have continued to rise, and there is an increasing sense that the 
pressures on the NHS are threatening to overwhelm the service.  
While accepting fully that NHS expenditure cannot increase indefinitely, for almost all of its 
existence the NHS has received less funding than VLPLODUQDWLRQ¶VKHDOWKV\VWHPV, and this 
means not only that the funding in any given year is likely to be too little, but also that there 
is a cumulative backlog of under-funding. For all the attention reorganizations get, they do 
not seem to make the difference policymakers imagine them to have, and based on the 
improvements in measurable outcomes achieved in the NHS between 2002 and 2010, the 
increase in funding in the 2000s seems to have been the most significant factor in improving 
measurable health outcomes. Increases in funding, however, cannot solve the problems of the 
NHS alone, and need to be combined with an approach to health organization that is based on 
DPRUHFROODERUDWLYHDSSURDFKWKDQ/DERXU¶VµFKRLFHDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶and with that 
collaboration being especially important between health and social care. 
The debate around NHS funding is also linked to the wider economic context with which the 
paper began. /DERXU¶VPRGHORILQFUHDVHGSXEOLFfinancing, especially that of the NHS, was 
based on economic growth generated from the City of London, and has clearly now been 
undermined. /DERXU¶VGHSHQGHQFHon the deregulation of the financial services industry to 
generate sufficient taxation to pay for health service improvement failed spectacularly in 
2008 (Engelend et al, 2011)DQGWKHµDXVWHULW\¶EDVHGSROLWLFVDQGHFRQRPLFVVLQFHKDV
created a hostile climate for arguments about increasing public funding (Taylor-Gooby, 
2015). However, there is a real need to find ways of opening debates about how much 
funding NHS should receive, and of recognising public services as crucial infrastructure for 
economic development and wellbeing, not as burdens on the economy (Galbraith, 1996). This 
is likely to lead to the better-off paying more in taxation to pay for much-needed 
improvements in public service funding rather than engaging in more needless and expensive 
reorganization. 
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